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Sync OpenBSD patchset 181:

Browse Source 
Make all messages sent between the client and server fixed size.

This is the first of two changes to make the protocol more resilient and less
sensitive to other changes in the code, particularly with commands. The client
now packs argv into a buffer and sends it to the server for parsing, rather
than doing it itself and sending the parsed command data.

As a side-effect this also removes a lot of now-unused command marshalling
code.

Mixing a server without this change and a client with or vice versa will cause
tmux to hang or crash, please ensure that tmux is entirely killed before
upgrading.
This commit is contained in:
Tiago Cunha
2009-07-28 22:12:16 +00:00
parent f5c0695605
commit d637cb33da
82 changed files with 335 additions and 862 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

128
tmux.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $Id: tmux.c,v 1.149 2009-07-23 13:15:41 tcunha Exp $ */
/* $Id: tmux.c,v 1.150 2009-07-28 22:12:16 tcunha Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2007 Nicholas Marriott <nicm@users.sourceforge.net>
@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ char *socket_path;
__dead void usage(void);
char *makesockpath(const char *);
int prepare_unlock(enum hdrtype *, void **, size_t *, int);
int prepare_cmd(enum hdrtype *, void **, size_t *, int, char **);
#ifndef HAVE_PROGNAME
char *__progname = (char *) "tmux";
@ -209,19 +211,70 @@ makesockpath(const char *label)
return (path);
}
int
prepare_unlock(enum hdrtype *msg, void **buf, size_t *len, int argc)
{
static struct msg_unlock_data unlockdata;
char *pass;
if (argc != 0) {
log_warnx("can't specify a command when unlocking");
return (-1);
}
if ((pass = getpass("Password: ")) == NULL)
return (-1);
if (strlen(pass) >= sizeof unlockdata.pass) {
log_warnx("password too long");
return (-1);
}
strlcpy(unlockdata.pass, pass, sizeof unlockdata.pass);
memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
*buf = &unlockdata;
*len = sizeof unlockdata;
*msg = MSG_UNLOCK;
return (0);
}
int
prepare_cmd(enum hdrtype *msg, void **buf, size_t *len, int argc, char **argv)
{
static struct msg_command_data cmddata;
client_fill_session(&cmddata);
cmddata.argc = argc;
if (cmd_pack_argv(argc, argv, cmddata.argv, sizeof cmddata.argv) != 0) {
log_warnx("command too long");
return (-1);
}
*buf = &cmddata;
*len = sizeof cmddata;
*msg = MSG_COMMAND;
return (0);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct client_ctx cctx;
struct msg_command_data cmddata;
struct buffer *b;
struct cmd_list *cmdlist;
struct cmd *cmd;
struct pollfd pfd;
enum hdrtype msg;
struct hdr hdr;
struct passwd *pw;
char *s, *path, *label, *cause, *home, *pass = NULL;
struct msg_print_data printdata;
char *s, *path, *label, *home, *cause;
char cwd[MAXPATHLEN];
void *buf;
size_t len;
int retcode, opt, flags, unlock, cmdflags = 0;
unlock = flags = 0;
@ -373,7 +426,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
exit(1);
}
}
if (label == NULL)
label = xstrdup("default");
if (path == NULL && (path = makesockpath(label)) == NULL) {
@ -392,36 +445,35 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
options_set_string(&global_s_options, "default-path", "%s", cwd);
if (unlock) {
if (argc != 0) {
log_warnx("can't specify a command when unlocking");
if (prepare_unlock(&msg, &buf, &len, argc) != 0)
exit(1);
}
cmdlist = NULL;
if ((pass = getpass("Password: ")) == NULL)
exit(1);
cmdflags &= ~CMD_STARTSERVER;
} else {
if (argc == 0) {
cmd = xmalloc(sizeof *cmd);
cmd->entry = &cmd_new_session_entry;
cmd->entry->init(cmd, 0);
if (prepare_cmd(&msg, &buf, &len, argc, argv) != 0)
exit(1);
}
cmdlist = xmalloc(sizeof *cmdlist);
TAILQ_INIT(cmdlist);
TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(cmdlist, cmd, qentry);
} else {
cmdlist = cmd_list_parse(argc, argv, &cause);
if (cmdlist == NULL) {
log_warnx("%s", cause);
exit(1);
}
if (unlock)
cmdflags &= ~CMD_STARTSERVER;
else if (argc == 0)
cmdflags |= CMD_STARTSERVER;
else {
/*
* It sucks parsing the command string twice (in client and
* later in server) but it is necessary to get the start server
* flag.
*/
if ((cmdlist = cmd_list_parse(argc, argv, &cause)) == NULL) {
log_warnx("%s", cause);
exit(1);
}
cmdflags &= ~CMD_STARTSERVER;
TAILQ_FOREACH(cmd, cmdlist, qentry) {
if (cmd->entry->flags & CMD_STARTSERVER) {
cmdflags |= CMD_STARTSERVER;
break;
}
}
cmd_list_free(cmdlist);
}
memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof cctx);
@ -429,20 +481,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
exit(1);
xfree(path);
b = buffer_create(BUFSIZ);
if (unlock) {
cmd_send_string(b, pass);
memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
client_write_server(
&cctx, MSG_UNLOCK, BUFFER_OUT(b), BUFFER_USED(b));
} else {
cmd_list_send(cmdlist, b);
cmd_list_free(cmdlist);
client_fill_session(&cmddata);
client_write_server2(&cctx, MSG_COMMAND,
&cmddata, sizeof cmddata, BUFFER_OUT(b), BUFFER_USED(b));
}
buffer_destroy(b);
client_write_server(&cctx, msg, buf, len);
memset(buf, 0, len);
retcode = 0;
for (;;) {
@ -476,12 +516,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
retcode = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case MSG_PRINT:
if (hdr.size > INT_MAX - 1)
if (hdr.size < sizeof printdata)
fatalx("bad MSG_PRINT size");
log_info("%.*s",
(int) hdr.size, BUFFER_OUT(cctx.srv_in));
if (hdr.size != 0)
buffer_remove(cctx.srv_in, hdr.size);
buffer_read(cctx.srv_in, &printdata, sizeof printdata);
printdata.msg[(sizeof printdata.msg) - 1] = '\0';
log_info("%s", printdata.msg);
goto restart;
case MSG_READY:
retcode = client_main(&cctx);